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Blum: Municipal Practice Theory

THE THEORY OF MUNICIPAL CUSTOM AND
PRACTICE
Karen Blum*
JUDGE PRATT:
Thank you. Moving ahead, professor Karen Blum will
discuss Section 1983 on municipal custom and practice. She has
been here many times before and we welcome her back.
We will lead off with Professor Blum who will lay out the
ground work. Then, we will get into some of the details.
PROFESSOR BLUM:
Good afternoon. It is a pleasure to be back. I am going to talk a
little about the theory of municipal custom and practice cases. For
those of you who are not vell-versed in the area of Section 1983
litigation, a plaintiff attempting to prove municipal or local
government liability under Section 1983 will generally rely on one
of four recognized methods for establishing such liability.
The first method is exemplified by Monell v. Dep't of Social
Services ofthe City ofNew York,' where the plaintiffs pointed to an
officially adopted, written regulation of the City of New York that
required pregnant employees to stop working at a given point in
time, even if not medically necessary.2 Where, as in Monell, a
formal and officially adopted policy is found to be
unconstitutional, a single application of that policy will result in
government liability.3 Official policy cases usually are not too
*Professor of Law, Suffolk University Law School.

B.A., 1968, Wells

College; J.D., 1974, Suffolk University; L.L.M., 1976, Harvard University.
' Monell v. Dep't of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658
(1978).
2
Id. at 661.
3 Id at 700; see also City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247
(1981) (challenging the vote of the city council to cancel license for rock
concert); Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980) (finding that
personnel decision made by city council constitutes official city policy); O'Brien
v. City of Grand Rapids, 23 F.3d 990, 1004 (6th Cir. 1994) (noting that "[t]he
official policy proved at trial was the decision to follow the teachings of [a
national authority] and to adopt his philosophy in developing a response plan for
critical incident management... In accordance with his teachings, Grand
Rapids followed the routine practice of not securing warrants during the
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troublesome, unless they present a controversy about whose policy
it is that has caused the constitutional injury.
It is important that the challenged policy statement, ordinance,
regulation, or decision actually is adopted or promulgated by the
local entity. A local government's mere enforcement of state law,
as opposed to express incorporation or adoption of state law into
local regulations or codes, has been found insufficient to establish
Monell liability.4 Local government entities may take the position

management of critical incidents. The trouble is that this policy was illegal");
Grow v. City of Milwaukee, 84 F. Supp. 2d 990 (E.D. Wis. 2000) In Grow the
court found as follows:
In the present case the city of Milwaukee has an express policy requiring
police officers, whether on or off duty, to submit to alcohol tests
whenever two supervisors observing the officer have a reasonable
suspicion to believe that the member is intoxicated. The policy
necessarily requires that suspected officers be taken to police stations
where the tests are administered, because it is understood by police
officers that is where the tests take place. The policy makes no exception
for officers suspected of being intoxicated in their homes. The seizures of
Lindsey and Grow were conducted pursuant to this express policy. If the
seizures are ultimately determined to have been unreasonable, the City
may properly be held liable for the deprivations of constitutional rights.
Id. at 1007.
4 See, e.g., Bethesda Lutheran Homes and Services, Inc. v. Leean,
154 F.3d
716, 718 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that "[w]hen the municipality is acting under
compulsion of state or federal law, it is the policy contained in that state or
federal law, rather than anything devised or adopted by the municipality, that is
responsible for the injury"); West v. Congemi, 28 F. Supp.2d 385, 394 (E.D. La.
1998) (noting that "[t]he Fifth Circuit has long recognized that simply following
the mandatory dictates of state law cannot form a predicate for Monell
liability"); but see Smith v. City of Dayton, 68 F. Supp.2d 911 (S.D. Ohio 1999)
In Smith the court found that:
In Kallstrom, the Sixth Circuit held the City of Columbus could be liable
despite the fact that it, like the City of Dayton here, was carrying out an
unconstitutional state-created policy, rather than its own policy. While it
seems anomalous to hold a city liable for following a mandatory state
law, which had not yet been declared unconstitutional, the Sixth Circuit
did not pause on this question. This Court accordingly assumes a
municipality may be held liable under § 1983 for carrying out an
unconstitutional state law, even though the law has not yet been held
unconstitutional.
Id. at 917-18.
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that they are merely enforcing state or federal policy rather than a
policy of the local entity.'
For example, in Tennessee v. Garner,6 the state of Tennessee had
a statute that allowed the shooting of all fleeing felons! This
statute was challenged in the Supreme Court and was struck down
as applied to the shooting of a non-dangerous, unarmed, fleeing
burglar.8 The Court in Garner established guidelines for
determining when the use of deadly force would be
constitutionally justified. 9
When the case was remanded to the Sixth Circuit, the only
defendants remaining in the suit were the City of Memphis and the
police department. The individual officer had qualified immunity'0
and the state could not be sued under Section 1983 because it
enjoyed immunity under the Eleventh Amendment." The Sixth
Circuit rejected defendants' argument that they had no choice but
to follow the state fleeing felon policy holding that "[d]efendants'
decision to authorize use of deadly force to apprehend

'See, e.g., Garner v. Memphis Police Dep't, 8 F.3d 358 (6th Cir. 1993).
6471 U.S. 1 (1985).
' Id at 4-5. A Tennessee statute provided that "[If], after notice of the
intention to arrest the defendant, he either flees or forcibly resists, the officer
may use all the necessary means to effect the arrest." Id. citing TENN. CODE
ANN, § 40-7-108 (1982).
s Id at 11.
9 1d
'0Id The officer enjoyed qualified immunity because he acted in good faith
reliance on the Tennessee Statute, and the law was not clearly established that
the officer's conduct violated the Fourth Amendment.
"See U.S. CoNsT. Amend. XI. The Eleventh Amendment provides that:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend
to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of
any Foreign State.
Id. See also Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989). In
Will, the Court held that neither a state nor a state official in his official capacity
is a "person" for purposes of a section 1983 damages action. Thus, even if a
state is found to have waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity in federal
court, or even if a § 1983 action is brought in state court, where the Eleventh
Amendment has no applicability, Will precludes a damages action against the
state governmental entity. Id.at 71.
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nondangerous fleeing burglary suspects was,.., a deliberate
choice from among various alternatives...., 2
A second method of establishing local government liability is
through the attribution of certain decisions or conduct by final
policymakers of the entity. In its Pembaur/PraprotniklJettline of
cases, 3 the Supreme Court held that a single decision or act by a
final policymaker in that area could be attributed to the local
government entity for purposes of liability under Section 1983."4 In
Pembaur, for example, the County was held responsible for the
single, ad hoc decision of the County prosecutor, who was
determined to be the final policymaker on matters of law
enforcement in the County and who ordered police officers to "go
in and get" witnesses in a situation that involved entering the
premises of a third party without a warrant for such entry." The
question of who is a final policymaker is a question of state law. 16
v. Memphis Police Dep't, 8 F.3d 358, 364 (6th Cir. 1993), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 1219 (1994). For other examples of cases where the courts
have rejected attempts to shift liability to the state or at least away from the local
government unit, on the theory that the local government was merely enforcing
a state authorized policy, see, e.g., DePiero v. City of Macedonia, 180 F.3d 770
(6th Cir. 1999); Brotherton v. Cleveland, 173 F.3d 552 (6th Cir. 1999);
McKusick v. City of Melbourne, 96 F.3d 478(11th Cir. 1996); Community
Health Care Association of New York v. DeParle, 69 F. Supp. 2d 463 (S.D.N.Y.
1999); see generally Caminero v. Rand. 882 F. Supp. 1319, 1325 (S.D.N.Y.
1995) (reviewing cases in this area and concluding that cases "suggest a
reasoned distinction between (1) cases in which a plaintiff alleges that a
municipality inflicted a constitutional deprivation by adopting an
unconstitutional policy that was in some way authorized or mandated by state
law and (2) cases in which a plaintiff alleges that a municipality, which adopted
no specific policy in the area at issue, caused a constitutional deprivation by
simply enforcing state law. While allegations of the former type have been
found to provide a basis for Section 1983 liability, [cites omitted] allegations of
the latter variety may not [footnote omitted] provide a remedy against the
municipality[. cites omitted]").
13Jett v. Dallas Independent School District, 491 U.S. 701 (1989); City of St.
Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112 (1988); Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475
U.S. 469 (1986).
14 See e.g., Pembaur v. City of Cincinati, 475 U.S. 469, (1986); Jett v. Dallas
Independent School District, 491 U.S. 701 (1989); Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S.
112 (1988).
2 Garner

Pembaur,475 U.S. at 485.

16 Id. at

483.
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A third method of establishing local government liability is by
demonstrating the requisite deliberate indifference on the part of
the municipality to recurring constitutional violations committed
by non-policymaking employees 7 or deliberate indifference to a
very strong likelihood that constitutional rights will be violated as
a result of failing to train, supervise or discipline in certain areas
where the need for such training is obvious. 8 Liability in such
cases is based on the Supreme Court's decisions in City of Canton
9 and Boardof County Commissionersof Bryan County x.
v Harris,1
Brown. In City of Canton cases, liability of the municipality will
be derivative. That is, if there is no underlying constitutional
violation committed by the non-policymaking employee, there will
17 See, e.g., Pena v. Leombruni, 200 F.3d 1031, 1033, 1034 (7th Cir. 1999)

(finding that "[I]f Winnebago County had seen a rash of police killings of crazy

people and it was well understood that these killings could have been avoided by
the adoption of measures that would adequately protect the endangered police,

then the failure to take these measures might, we may assume without having to
decide, be found to manifest deliberate indifference to the rights of such
people"); Chew v. Gates, 27 F.3d 1432, 1445 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting that

"[w]here the city equips its police officers with potentially dangerous animals,
and evidence is adduced that those animals inflict injury in a significant
percentage of the cases in which they are used, a failure to adopt a departmental

policy governing their use, or to implement rules or regulations regarding the
constitutional limits of that use, evidences a 'deliberate indifference' to
constitutional rights").
18 Allen v. Muskogee, 119 F.3d 837, 843, 844 (10th Cir. 1997) (finding that
"[w]hen read as a whole and viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff
as the party opposing summary judgment, the record supports an inference that
the City trained its officers to leave cover and approach armed suicidal,
emotionally disturbed persons and to try to disarm them, a practice contrary to
proper police procedures and tactical principles .... The evidence is sufficient to
support an inference that the need for different training was so obvious and the
inadequacy so likely to result in violation of constitutional rights that the
policymakers of the city could reasonably be said to have been deliberately
indifferent to the need"); Weaver v. Tipton County, 41 F. Supp.2d 779, 792
(W.D. Tenn. 1999). In Weaver, "[b]ased on the evidence before it, the court
finds a reasonable juror could conclude that Tipton County's failure to ensure
that adequate staffing, training, and/or supervision polices were in place and
enforced would so obviously result in the violation of prisoners' constitutional
rights that Tipton County could be found deliberately indifferent").
'9City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989).
20

Board of County Commissioners of Bryan County v. Brown, 117 S. Ct.

1382 (1997).

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2000

5

Touro Law Review, Vol. 16, No. 3 [2000], Art. 8

830

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol 16

be no municipal liability based on a policy of deliberate
21
indifference to such violations.
The focus of this presentation is the fourth method of making out
a case against the municipality under Section 1983, the so-called
"custom or practice" theory of liability. We are talking about a
practice, custom or usage that is so widespread and so persistent
that it has the force of law. A good description of the difference
between a formal policy and a custom is contained in Britton v.
Maloney.? Unlike a policy, which is established by the top-down
affirmative decision of a policymaker, a custom develops from the
bottom up.23 It is the subordinate, lower level, non-policymaking
employees that engage in a certain practice or custom which
becomes "the way things are done. '24 The following cases provide
some examples of "custom or practice" liability under Section
1983:
Sharp v. City of Houston was a code of silence case out of the
Fifth Circuit. The plaintiff introduced evidence of retaliation for
having violated the code of silence, which had the effect of proving
the code's existence. 6 The Fifth Circuit stated that "[t]he jury
could have surmised that co-workers and supervisors enforced this
[Houston Police Department] wide 'code of silence' by retaliatory

21 See

City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796 (1986). In Heller the Court
held that if there is no constitutional violation, there can be no liability on the
part of the individual officer or the government body. Id. "If a person has
suffered no constitutional injury at the hands of the individual police officer, the
fact that the departmental regulations might have authorized the use of

constitutionally excessive force is quite beside the point." Id. at 799 (emphasis
in original). But see Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1213 (3d Cir. 1996)
(noting that "[t]he precedent in our circuit requires the district court to review
the plaintiffs' municipal liability claims independently of the section 1983
claims against the individual police officers, as the City's liability for a
substantive due process violation does not depend upon the liability of any
police officer").
" 901 F. Supp. 444 (D. Mass. 1995).

231d, at 450.
24 id.

's
164 F.3d 923 (5th Cir. 1999).
26
1d. at 935.
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acts.?7 If the jury finds a code of silence is enforced as a matter of
custom, usage, or policy, then the city can be held liable. 8
The court, in Bordanaro v. McLeod,29 found that the city of
Everett, Massachusetts had a custom of allowing police officers to
knock down doors whenever they were in pursuit of a fleeing
felon?6 This was held to be unconstitutional.'
In Dykema v. Skoumal,32 the plaintiff was unable to point to
specific written guidelines directing police officers not to protect
confidential informants or not to train police officers working with
confidential informants. 3 The court found that the plaintiff had
sufficiently alleged that the municipality and county should be held
liable based on the custom or practice prong of Monell, based on
"an unwritten custom and practice of not providing training and
protection for individuals who were used as informants in police
undercover activities and not providing training to police officers
''
who worked with confidential informants."
In Lauro v. City of New York, 5 the court found that "perp walks"
done for the purpose of allowing the press to get a photo
opportunity for particularly newsworthy suspects, constituted an
unconstitutional custom or practice that was condoned by the city
of New York.36
Gary v.Sheehane and Thomas v. District of Columbia3 both
point out that a municipality may be liable based on custom or
practice, even where the custom or practice is actually contrary to

27

1d

2

SId

F.2d 1151 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied,493 U.S. 820 (1989).
"OId at 1159.

29871
31

Id

32No.98 C 5309, 1999 WL 417360 (N.D. IIl. 1999).
33
ld at *6-7.
341d

3539 F. Supp. 2d 351, 364-65 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).

6Id at 365. The Lauro court held that the perp walk lacked any legitimate law
enforcement objective, and failed the basic test of constitutionality as laid out in
Turnerv. Safley, 482 US 78, 90 (1987). Id
37 No.

96 C 7294, 1998 WL 6547116 (N.D. III. 1998).

38887 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1995).
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written policy.39 If it turns out that the municipality had either
actual or constructive knowledge of the practice, the municipality
will still be "on the hook" under Section 1983.
Some of the cases discuss how many incidents must be shown
before a custom can be said to exist. If a person is in Washington,
D.C., six incidents of alleged excessive use of force might not be
statistically sufficient over a given period of time.4" However, six
incidents of excessive use of force within the same period of time
in a small town with five or six police officers may be a lot.4
Attention must be paid to the facts of the particular case, because
this theory of municipal liability is based on policymakers' actual
4
or constructive knowledge of the practice and acquiescence in it. 2
There are a number of cases where the plaintiffs failed to make
out their case, because they never presented any evidence that
policymakers were aware of this pattern or custom. In Floyd v.
Waiters,43 the plaintiff contended that there was a long standing
and widespread custom, where male security guards would
transport female students to certain places to engage in illicit sex."
at5.
See generally, Carter v. District of Columbia, 795 F.2d 116 (D.C. Cir.
1986).
"' See e.g., Brown v. City of Margate,842 F. Supp. 515, 518 (S.D. Fla. 1993)
(finding "[A] smaller number of incidents where the investigation and resulting
disciplinary actions were inadequate may be more indicative of a pattern than a
larger number of incidents where the department fully and satisfactorily
addressed the mater and responded appropriately.... While the six incidents of
alleged excessive use of force in Carter[v. Districtof Columbia] may not have
been statistically significant in Washington, D.C., three such incidents may be
sufficient to establish a pattern in Margate").
42
See, e.g., McNabola v. Chicago TransitAuthority, 10 F.3d 501, 511 (7th Cir.
1993) (noting that "[a] municipal 'custom' may be established by proof of the
knowledge of policymaking officials and their acquiescence in the established
39

1d.

40

practice"); Sorlucco v. New York City Police Department,971 F.2d 864, 871 (2d

Cir. 1992) (determining that "a § 1983 plaintiff may establish a municipality's
liability by demonstrating that the actions of subordinate officers are sufficiently
widespread to constitute the constructive acquiescence of senior policymakers");
Brown v. City of Fort Lauderdale,923 F.2d 1474 (11th Cir. 1991) (finding that
"a longstanding and widespread practice is deemed authorized by the
policymaking officials because they must have known about it but failed to stop
it").
41 133 F.3d 786 (11th Cir. 1998).
" Id. at 788.
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The court concluded that this did not constitute a school district
custom that could support Section 1983 liability.!' The court
reasoned that the policymaking officials did not know what the
male security guards were doing and, as a result, there would be no
liability, because a custom required that policymaking officials
know about the widespread practice and fail to do anything about
it 6
Sometimes having no policy can be an unconstitutional policy or
custom. Presently, a class action lawsuit is being litigated in
Boston,4 7 because there is no place to hold female detainees. '8 As a
result, they are taken over to the Suffolk County Jail where they
are put in with the general population, and automatically stripsearched.49 Neither the county nor the City of Boston had an
official policy requiring individualized suspicion, and a blanket
strip-search practice had existed for years.
A lot of these cases fall under the City of Canton category.? In
the City of Canton cases, the plaintiff is required to show that the
city's policy was deliberately indifferent to the likelihood that
underlying constitutional violations will occur.5 In City of Canton,
the Court set out two ways that plaintiffs could demonstrate
deliberate indifference. - First, a plaintiff may establish deliberate
indifference by demonstrating a failure to train officials in a
specific area where there is an obvious need for training to avoid
violations of citizens' constitutional rights.1 Second, plaintiff may
4SId

at 795.

4Id
at 795 (citing Brown v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 923 F.2d 1474 (11th Cir.
1991); see also Jane Doe A. v. Special School District, 901 F.2d 642 (8th Cir.
1990); Samarco v. Neumann, 44 F. Supp. 2d 1276 (S.D. Fla. 1999).
'7Mack v. Suffolk County, 191 F.RLD. 16 (D. Mass. 2000) (opinion certifyring
class). See also, Lawyers Asks to Expand Lmsuit over Strip-Searches. THE
BOSTON GLOBE. October 29, 1999 at B3.

49id

49Id
50 489
51

5Id

U.S. 378 (1989).

Id

at 396-97.

s For example, all of the Justices agreed that there is an obvious need to train
police officers as to the constitutional limitations on the use of deadly force, see
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985), and that a failure to so train would be
so certain to result in constitutional violations as to reflect the "deliberate
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rely on a pattern of unconstitutional conduct so pervasive as to
imply actual or constructive knowledge on the part of
policymakers, whose deliberate indifference, evidenced by a
failure to correct once the need for training became obvious, would
be attributable to the municipality. 4 There is general agreement
indifference" to constitutional rights required for the imposition of municipal
liability. 489 U.S. at 390 n.10. But see Pena v. Leombruni, 200 F.3d 1031 (7th
Cir. 1999). The court found that:
failing merely to instruct police on the handling of dangerous people who
appear to be irrational cannot amount to deliberate indifference, at least
on the facts presented in this case. The sheriff had announced a policy
that... the deputies were not to use deadly force unless they (or other
persons) were threatened by death or great bodily harm, and this policy
covered the case of the crazy assailant, giving him all the protection to
which constitutional law entitled him. Maybe despite what we have just
said it would be desirable to take special measures to render such a
person harmless without killing or wounding him.... but if so the failure
to adopt those measures would not be more than negligence, which is not
actionable under section 1983.
Id. at 1033.

"' See, e.g., Brown v. Shaner, 172 F.3d 927, 931 (6th Cir. 1999) ("The Court
[in Canton] indicated at least two types of situations that would justify a
conclusion of deliberate indifference in the failure to train police officers. One
is failure to provide adequate training in light of foreseeable consequences that
could result from the lack of instruction.... A second type of situation
justifying a conclusion of deliberate indifference is where the city fails to act in
response to repeated complaints of constitutional violations by its officers.").
See also Cornfield v. Consolidated High School District No. 230, 991 F.2d
1316, 1327 (7th Cir. 1993); Thelma D. v. Board of Education of the City of St.
Louis, 934 F.2d 929, 934-45 (8th Cir.1991). Compare Guseman v. Martinez, I
F. Supp.2d 1240, 1261 (D. Kan. 1998) ("It would not have been 'known or
obvious' to a reasonable policymaker that a failure to provide immediate further
training would likely result in a deprivation of constitutional rights. Such an
eventuality would have seemed remote prior to this incident. Despite the fact
that the city had no policy prohibiting restraint techniques of the type
challenged, no person had ever before died of positional asphyxiation while in
Wichita police custody. There were no known court decisions finding that the
use of prone restraint techniques on a person who had resisted arrest was a
violation of the person's constitutional rights. The materials in the record
indicate that positional asphyxiation is a relatively rare event brought on by a
unique combination of circumstances. Plaintiffs cite no evidence that the
dangers of positional asphyxiation were widely understood prior to this incident
or that police departments in general considered such information to be an
essential part of their training regimens.") with Johnson v. City of Cincinnati, 39
F. Supp.2d 1013, 1019, 1020 (S.D. Ohio 1999) ("Plaintiff provides evidence
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among the Circuits that post-event evidence may be relevant and
admissible to prove the existence of a practice or custom.55
from which a reasonable jury could infer that dealing with highly agitated
persons was a recurring situation for law enforcement officials nationwide and
in Cincinnati and that a violation of civil rights is predictable result of being
inadequately trained to handle such persons. Plaintiff provides evidence that
City officials knew of the potential danger of the prone restraint before Wilder's
death.... On the basis of this evidence the Court believes that a reasonable jury
could find that the City had notice of the potential hazards of agitated delirium
with restraint and that the City was deliberately indifferent in failing to
adequately train the police and firefighters on how to deal with 'at risk'
persons.").
' See, e.g., Beck v. City of Pittsburgh, 89 F.3d 966, 973 (3d Cir. 1996)
(recognizing that post-event incident "may have evidentiary value for a jury's
consideration whether the City and policymakers had a pattern of tacitly
approving the use of excessive force"); Foley v. City of Lowell, 948 F.2d 10,
13-15 (1st Cir. 1991); Grandstaffv. City of Borger, 767 F.2d 161, 171 (5th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 916 (1987); see also Henry v. County of Shasta,
132 F.3d 512,518-20 (9th Cir. 1997), amendedon denial ofrehearing, 137 F.3d

1372 (9th Cir. 1998), where the court made the following observations:
Here, factual issues were presented that the county acted in accordance
with an established policy of deliberate indifference to violation of rights
by stripping and detaining in rubber rooms persons stopped for minor,
non-jailable traffic offenses who refuse to sign a notice to appear, or
demand to be taken before a magistrate. There was evidence that the
county permitted an almost identical incident as that complained of by
Henry to occur after the county was sued and after being put on notice
unequivocally of its deputies' and nurses' unconstitutional treatment of
Henry.... In holding that the May and Bums declarations may be used

to establish municipal liability although the events related therein
occurred after the series of incidents that serves as the basis for Henry's
claims, we reiterate our rule that post-event evidence is not only
admissible for purposes of proving the existence of a municipal
defendant's policy or custom, but may be highly probative with respect
to that inquiry... When a county continues to turn a blind eye to severe
violations of inmates' constitutional rights-despite having received
notice of such violations-a rational fact finder may properly infer the
existence of a previous policy or custom of deliberate indifference.... If
a municipal defendant's failure to fire or reprimand officers evidences a
policy of deliberate indifference to their misconduct, surely its failure
even after being sued to correct a blatantly unconstitutional course of
treatment- stripping persons who have committed minor traffic
infractions, throwing them naked into a 'rubber room' and holding them
there for ten hours or more for failing to sign a traffic ticket or asserting
their legal right to be brought before a magistrate-is even more
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It is worth noting that plaintiffs can sometimes build a case
against a municipality based on a pattern or custom with respect to
a single officer. In Vann v. City of New York 6 and Beck v. City of
Pittsburgh,s ' the Courts of Appeals found that evidence of repeated
complaints of excessive force against an individual officer, along
with other indicators of a pattern of violent behavior, was
sufficient to create an issue of municipal liability based on the
policymakers' deliberate indifference to an obvious need for more
or better discipline and supervision. The court in Vann concluded
as follows:
An obvious need [for more or better supervision] may be
demonstrated through proof of repeated complaints of civil
rights violations; deliberate indifference may be inferred if
the complaints are followed by no meaningful attempt on the
part of the municipality to investigate or to forestall further
incidents.... [A] rational jury could find that where an
officer had been identified by the police department as a
'violent prone' individual who had a personality disorder
manifested by frequent quick-tempered demands for
'respect,' escalating into physical confrontations for which
he always disavowed responsibility, the need to be alert for
new civilian complaints filed after his reinstatement to full58
duty status was obvious.
persuasive evidence of deliberate indifference or of a policy encouraging
such official misconduct. May's and Bums' declarations are sufficient to
show for purposes of summary judgment that such abuse of people who
commit minor infractions is 'the way things are done and have been
done' in Shasta County, and thus would allow a jury to make a finding as
to the existence of a policy or custom.
56 72 F.3d 1040 (2d Cir.. 1995). Vann was a bus driver who got into an
accident with an off-duty police officer. The officer called Vann a "nigger,"
drew his gun and threatened to shoot him. The officer proceeded to hit Vann in
the head and throw him against the bus causing several injuries. The officer
arrested Vann but the precinct commander voided the arrest. Id.
57 89 F.3d 966 (3d Cir. 1996). Beck had skidded in a circle in a wet parking lot
after a party and was blocked from leaving by a police cruiser. The police
officer ordered Beck out of the car, shoved his gun in Beck's face, cursed and
used obscene language, struck him in the face six to eight times with the end of
the gun and kicked him in the ribs. The officer subsequently arrested Beck and
charged him for driving under the influence of alcohol and reckless driving. Id.
58 Vann, 72 F.3d at 1049, 1051.
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There are two cases I just wanted to mention that are not in the
program materials, but that present interesting situations. If you
represent school boards, especially if you are in Pennsylvania, you
59 was a case
will want to pay attention. Kurilla v. Callahan,
involving a teacher who had a physical altercation with a student. 60
The teacher evidently forcefully grabbed this student; his fist hit
the student's chest in such a way as to bruise it, but no medical
care was needed. 6' While this particular assault was preceded by
only one incident, it happens that there were three incidents within
less than one year involving this teacher. The failure to take any
disciplinary action against the teacher following the three incidents
in a span of less than one year was found by the court to be
"probative of the question as to whether the School District had a
policy or custom to tolerate or be deliberately indifferent to the
excessive use of force by teachers."' An interesting aspect to this
case is that this was a substantive due process claim raised by the
student against the teacher, it was not a seizure; it was not a Fourth
Amendment claim; and it was not an Eighth Amendment claim."
The court applied the "shocks the conscience/purpose to harm"
standard of County of Sacramento v. Lewis as the level of
culpability that would be required to establish a substantive due
process violation as to this momentary use of force by the school
teacher.' The court found the standard was not satisfied, so the
teacher did not commit a substantive due process violation, but the
School District could still be held liable."3 The court relied on a
Third Circuit line of cases that permits a finding of municipal

5968

6

F. Supp. 2d 556 (M.D. Pa. 1999).

Kurilla, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 55Z

61d

6-ld
63

1d

at 568-69.

61523 U.S. 833 (1998).

65 Kurilla,68 F. Supp. 2d at 564. "The pertinent inquiry is 'whether the force
applied caused injuries so severe, was so disproportionate to the need presented,
and was so inspired by malice or sadism rather than a merely careless or unwise
excess of zeal that it amounted to a brutal and inhumane abuse of official power
literally shocking to the conscience."' Id.
66M.at 565.
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liability for a substantive due process violation independent of the
liability of any individual official. 67
Thus, the court in Kurilla concluded that the School District
could still be held liable if it had a "custom or policy condoning
use of excessive force by teachers that evidenced a deliberate
indifference to the student's constitutional rights in bodily integrity
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment."68
A final case I thought worth calling to your attention involves
another example of school district liability in Pennsylvania. In
Sciotto v. Marple Newtown High School,69 the court concluded that
plaintiffs had introduced sufficient evidence from which a
reasonable jury could find that the school district policymakers
were aware of and had ratified a longstanding tradition and custom
of inviting "older, heavier, more experienced wrestlers to practice
with the Marple Newtown High School's wrestling team.... '
The consequences of the tradition were tragic in this case, where a
sixteen-year-old, 110 pound, high school student was injured in a
67 See, e.g., Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1213 (3d Cir. 1996)

("The

precedent in our circuit requires the district court to review the plaintiffs'
municipal liability claims independently of the section 1983 claims against the

individual police officers, as the City's liability for a substantive due process
violation does not depend upon the liability of any police officer"); Fagan v.
City of Vineland, 22 F.3d 1283, 1292 (3d Cir. 1994) (Fagan I) (holding that in
the context of "a substantive due process case arising out of a police pursuit, an
underlying constitutional tort can still exist even if no individual police officer
violated the Constitution ....

A finding of municipal liability does not depend

automatically or necessarily on the liability of any police officer"); Simmons v.
City of Philadelphia, 947 F.2d 1042, 1058-65 (3d Cir. 1991) (no inconsistency
in jury's determination that police officer's actions did not amount to

constitutional violation, while city was found liable under § 1983 on theory of
policy of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of intoxicated and
potentially suicidal detainees and failure to train officers to detect and meet such
needs). For criticism that this author has directed at the legal reasoning used in
this line of cases, see Karen M. Blum, Municipal Liability: Derivative or
Direct? Distinguishingthe Canton Case from the Collins Case, 48 DePaul L.

Rev.
687 (1999).
6

Kurilla,68 F. Supp.2d at 565.

69 Sciotto v. Marple Newtown School District, 81 F. Supp.2d 559 (E.D. Pa.

1999).
70
Id. at 576.
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match against a heavier, more experienced alumnus."' The student
was rendered a quadriplegic as a result of his injuries. n The court
found an underlying substantive due process violation based on the
state-created danger theory, 3 and enough evidence to put to the
jury on the question as to whether the school district could be held
liable based on the knowledge, acquiescence and ratification of this
custom and tradition.74 If you are practicing in Pennsylvania, or
anywhere in the Third Circuit, I would take a look at both Kurilla
and Sciotto, especially if you are representing school districts.
I see my time is up. Thank you and good luck with your cases!

71 Id. at
72

562.

Id

Id at 567. The Third Circuit has recognized a state-created danger theory of
liability under the Substantive Due Process Clause. See, eg., Kneipp v. Tedder,
95 F.3d 1199, 1208 (3d Cir. 1996) ("In the 1995 case of Mark %tBorough of
Hatboro, .... we suggested a test for applying the state-created danger theory.
We found that cases predicating constitutional liability on a state-created danger

theory have four common elements: 1) the harm ultimately caused was
foreseeable and fairly direct; (2) the state actor acted in willful disregard for the
safety of the plaintiff; (3)there existed some relationship between the state and
the plaintiff; (4) the state actors used their authority to create an opportunity that
otherwise would not have existed for the third party's crime to occur. 51 F.3d at
1152.").
74Sciotto,

81 F. Supp.2d at 575-76.
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